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Abstract
We describe CSAR, a novel technique for generating cryp-
tographically strong, accountable randomness. Using
CSAR, we can generate a pseudo-random sequence and
a proof that the elements of this sequence up to a given
point have been correctly generated, while future values
in the sequence remain unpredictable. CSAR enables ac-
countability for distributed systems that use randomized
protocols. External auditors can check if a node has devi-
ated from its expected behavior without learning anything
about the node’s future random choices. In particular, an
accountable node does not need to leak secrets that would
make its future actions predictable. We demonstrate that
CSAR is practical and efﬁcient, and we apply it to imple-
ment accountability for a server that uses random sam-
pling for billing purposes.
1 Introduction
Nodes in distributed systems can fail for many reasons: a
node can suffer a hardware or software failure, an attacker
can compromise a node, or a node's operator can deliber-
ately tamper with its software. Moreover, faulty nodes are
not uncommon [24]. As a system grows larger, it is in-
creasingly likely that some nodes are accidentally miscon-
guredor have been compromisedas a result of unpatched
security vulnerabilities.
Recent work has explored the use of accountabil-
ity to detect and expose node faults in distributed sys-
tems [28, 16]. Accountable systems maintain a tamper-
evidentrecordthatprovidesnon-repudiableevidenceofall
nodes' actions. Based on this record, a faulty node whose
observable behavior deviates from that of a correct node
can eventually be detected. At the same time, a correct
node can defend itself against any false accusations.
In PeerReview [16], for instance, each node maintains
a tamper-evident log, which records all messages the node
sends and receives as well as inputs and outputs of the ap-
plication. Any nodei can request the log of anothernodej
and independently determine whether j has deviated from
its expected behavior. To do this, i replays j's log using a
reference implementation that denes j's expected behav-
ior. By comparing the results of the replayed execution
with those recorded in the log, PeerReview can detect ob-
servable Byzantine faults without requiring a formal spec-
ication of the system.
The approach taken by PeerReview is very general, but
it requires that each node's actions be deterministic; other-
wise, a differentnon-deterministicchoicebya nodeand its
reference implementation would be classied incorrectly
as a fault. One approach to ensure deterministic behav-
ior is to disclose, as part of a node's record, the seed of
any pseudo-random number generator used in the node's
program. Unfortunately, disclosing the seed also reveals
any secrets that were randomly chosen by the node and
makes the futuresequenceof pseudo-randomnumberspre-
dictable. One could allow a node to choose a new seed
once it has proven that its past actions were fault-free.
However, this would allow a bad node to choose seeds
strategically, and thus to inuence its own pseudo-random
numbers.
Thus, applyingexisting accountabilitytechniques faces
us with a choice: we can make a node's actions (including
its adherence to a pseudo-random sequence) accountable
at the expense of revealing the node's secrets and making
its future actions predictable; or, we can protect a node's
secrets and keep its future actions unpredictable, but give
up the ability to verify that the node is following a pseudo-
random sequence of actions.
Consider, for instance, a distributed algorithm that uses
some form of statistical sampling. We would like to be
sure that each node follows a truly random sequence of
samples to ensure unbiased results. However, disclosing a
node's future random samples as a side-effect of auditing
the node's past actions may allow an attacker to adapt his
behavior to the expected sampling, thus biasing the results.
As a result, existing accountability techniques are not ap-
propriate for such protocols.
11.1 Our contributions
We contribute CSAR, a technique for generating Crypto-
graphically Strong, Accountable Randomness. CSAR al-
lows us to apply accountability techniques to probabilistic
protocols without making their actions predictable. More
precisely, we propose a pseudo-random generator that sat-
ises the following requirements:
1. The pseudo-random generator should output crypto-
graphically strong randomness. It is not sufcient for
theoutputofthegeneratortobeuniformlydistributed.
We requirethat the node generatingthe output should
only be able to compute values it could also compute
if the output was truly random.1
2. The pseudo-randomgeneratorshould be accountable,
i.e., after each random value r is generated, it should
be possible to generate a proof that this value r was
indeed correctly derived from a given seed. Thus, if
a node generates a value incorrectly, it can be held
accountable because it cannot produce a valid proof.
3. Future random values of correct nodes should be un-
predictable, i.e., to a node that learns random val-
ues r1;:::;ri and the corresponding proofs, all fu-
turerandomvaluesri+1;::: shouldstill lookrandom.
This excludes the obvious solution of using the ran-
dom seed as a proof.
4. Properties 1-3 should hold even if malicious nodes
are present while the seed is computed. In particular,
no node should be able to inuence the output of its
own generator by choosing a suitable seed.
Additionally, both generating the randomness and verify-
ing the corresponding proofs should be highly efcient, in
order to limit the cost of accountability relative to the ac-
tual protocol execution. This requirement excludes a gen-
eral solution based on zero-knowledge proofs.
CSAR achieves these goals with a protocol in which
an initial coin-toss is followed by a combination of hash-
ing (where the hash function is modeled as a random or-
acle) and a trapdoor one-way permutation. Our construc-
tion essentially constitutes a chain of inverse trapdoor ap-
plicationsstartingfromtheseedderivedfromthecoin-toss,
where the sequence is partitioned into blocks by interme-
diate applications of the hash function. The hash function
is additionallyused to transform elements of this sequence
into independent random values. The overall construction
1As a counterexample, consider a pseudo-random generator that pro-
duces random numbers as r = gx in some group G, where x is a random
element. The output of this generator is uniformly distributed, but the
node that generates r also knows the discrete logarithm of r - which it
could not know if r was a true random number.
resembles existing techniques for generating keys in cryp-
tographic le systems, e.g., [17, 1]. Elements in the se-
quence serve as a proof for former sequence elements and
hence for the corresponding random values, since a third
party can use the permutationto computeformer sequence
valuesandcomparethemwiththerandomvaluesthat were
used. The hardness of inverting the trapdoor permutation
and the usage of the random oracle prevent a prediction
of future sequence elements. This construction is efcient
(requiringonlyafew hashesandmultiplicationsinan RSA
group for each generation of a random value), and it can
be further optimized by exploiting number-theoretic prop-
erties of low-exponent RSA.
The security of CSAR is formally established by com-
paring it to an ideal specication of its expected behavior,
under the additional hypothesis that the surrounding pro-
tocol does not use the same hash function as that used for
generating the randomness. This corresponds to the well-
known simulatability paradigm of modern cryptography.
Among these, the Reactive Simulatability (RSIM) frame-
work [4] and the Universal Composability (UC) frame-
work [9] constitute the most prominent representatives;
they have been used to prove the security of various pro-
tocols. In particular, simulatability offers strong composi-
tionality guarantees.
CSAR can be used with different accountability tech-
niques; however, for concreteness, we present it in the
context of PeerReview. We implemented CSAR as an ex-
tension to the publicly available PeerReview library [25].
Adding support for accountable randomness enables the
use of PeerReview in applications that rely on unpre-
dictable random choices. Such applications include, for
instance, systems that rely on random sampling for secu-
rity monitoring or billing, randomized load balancing in
federated systems or randomized replica placement in dis-
tributed storage systems. Our evaluation shows that the
computational cost of our technique is low: on current
hardware and with a 1024-bit RSA modulus, a random
number can be generated in less than 20s and veried
in less than 10s. We also show that CSAR is practical
and that its storage and bandwidth costs are low, both in
relative and in absolute terms.
1.2 Related work
Veried random functions (VRFs) [22] and the stronger
simulatable VRFs [12] are closely related to the technique
proposed in this paper. However, even simulatable VRFs
cannot guarantee that the randomness produced by mali-
cious parties has strong properties when the malicious par-
ties release additionalinformationabout their seeds; hence
simulatableVRFs arenotsufcientforthescenarioconsid-
ered in this paper. Furthermore, VRFs, and even more so
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nique. In CSAR, we obtain the improved efciency, as
well as the ability to producestrong randomness when ma-
liciousparties disclosetheir seeds, byapplyingtherandom
oracle model, which permits very efcient constructions.
Hash chains [18] can be used to generate veriable
pseudo-random values. However, since each hash chain
canproduceonlyanitenumberofvalues,anupperbound
on the required output length must be known in advance.
Also, the hash chain must either be stored in memory or
recalculated from scratch after each invocation, both of
which are inefcient. Finally, the initial hash value must
remain secret, which enables an attacker to inuence at
least some bits of his randomness by choosing a suitable
initial hash. None of these limitations apply to CSAR.
Accountability in distributed systems has been sug-
gested as a means to achieve practical security [19], to cre-
ate an incentive for cooperative behavior [14], and even
as a general design goal for dependable networked sys-
tems [27]. Several recent systems provide accountability
for deterministic systems [29, 23, 16]. None of these sys-
tems can hold a node accountable for its random choices
without also making its future choices predictable, which
can make the node vulnerable to attacks and exploits.
1.3 Outline
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews cryptographicpreliminaries such as the ran-
dom oracle model and simulatable security notions. Sec-
tion 3 denes the security guarantees CSAR is designed to
fulll. Sections 4 and 5 present the protocol for generat-
ing accountable randomness and its security proof, respec-
tively. Section 6 sketches the implementation of CSAR
in the context of PeerReview, while Section 7 discusses
applications of CSAR. Section 8 reports on experimental
results to measure the efciency and storage consumption
of CSAR. Section 9 discusses possible variations of our
approach, and Section 10 concludes the paper.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The random oracle model
The random oracle model [6] is one of the most popu-
lar heuristics in cryptography. The security of virtually
all practically deployed public-key encryption and signa-
ture schemes relies on the random oracle model, e.g., that
of the RSA-OAEP encryption scheme [7] specied in the
PKCS #1 standard [26].
The random oracle model formalizes the intuition that
a good cryptographic hash function has essentially no rec-
ognizable structure, i.e., the function can be expected to
behave like a completely random function. Instead of
proving the protocol under consideration with respect to
some xed actual hash function H (e.g., SHA-1), proofs
in the random oracle model presuppose a function H :
f0;1g ! f0;1gl that is uniformly chosen from the set
of all such functions, i.e., for each value x, the value
H(x) constitutes a uniformly chosen value (with two calls
to H(x) returning the same value). The security of the
protocol under consideration is then proven by granting
the protocol oracle-access to H; the implementation, how-
ever, uses the concrete hash function. Although (patholog-
ical) protocols exist that violate the random oracle heuris-
tics [10], to the best of our knowledge there is no exam-
ple of a practical protocol that is proven secure within the
random oracle model but whose implementation turns out
to be insecure when implemented with a sufciently good
cryptographic hash function.
The random oracle model permits very efcient proto-
col constructions. In addition, the random oracle model
has the following advantage in our setting: our random-
ness generation protocol is only provablysecure if it relies
on a different hash function than the one used in the appli-
cation protocol. For an actual hash function,this statement
is difcult to formalize properly since the application pro-
tocol might only compute parts of the hash function,or the
function might be obfuscated. If one relies on the random
oracle model, this statement can be naturally formalized
by not allowing the application protocol to query the ora-
cle H.
2.2 Low-exponent RSA
In the following sections, we consider the low-exponent
RSA permutation fn(x) := x3 mod n, where n is a ran-
domRSA-modulus(a productof tworandomprimesp and
q of the same length) of some length l with 3 - '(n) =
(p   1)  (q   1). The low-exponent RSA permutation is
a variant of the RSA permutation in which the public ex-
ponent e is instantiated as a small xed number (in our
case e = 3). It is well known that naively using low-
exponent RSA in larger protocols is known to yield trou-
blesome scenarios. For example, using it as an encryption
scheme without additional padding allows an adversary to
recover a plaintext from seeing three encryptions of this
plaintext for three different public keys. However, it is a
well-accepted assumption that the low-exponent RSA per-
mutation itself is hard to invert. More exactly, we dene
the following function "3RSA.
Deﬁnition 1 Let "3RSA(l;s) be the maximum probabil-
ity over all circuits of size at most s that, upon input
of a random RSA modulus n of length l and a random
y 2 f0;:::;n   1g, the circuit outputs some x with
x3  y mod n.
3The low-exponentRSA assumptionfor e = 3 (abbreviated
3RSA) can be formally stated as follows:
Assumption 1 (3RSA) For l(k) 2 
(k) and any polyno-
mial s, "3RSA(l(k);s(k)) is negligible.
The 3RSA assumption trivially follows from the well-
established strong RSA assumption [5]. In addition, the
function fn can be inverted efciently if the factoriza-
tion of n = pq is known: One computes a secret key
d with 3d  1 mod '(n) and then computes f 1
n (x) =
xd mod n. In other words, under the 3RSA assumption,
fn constitutes a trapdoor one-way permutation.
2.3 Simulatable security
The security guarantees CSAR is designed to fulll will
be dened by an ideal functionality, which serves as a
specication of the protocol's desired behavior. Simulat-
able security then aims at showing that a protocol is as
good as its ideal functionality. This is formalized by re-
quiring that for any adversary A that attacks the protocol
(i.e., an adversary that controls the malicious nodes and
may intercept information) there exists a simulator S that
attacks the ideal functionality of the protocol, such that
any third entity, called the environment and intuitively de-
noting the application built on top of the protocol, cannot
distinguish between a run of the real protocol with A and
an execution of the ideal functionality with S. This ap-
proach for dening properties of cryptographic systems is
widely used in the cryptographic community, where it is
known as UC security (Universal Composability) [9] or as
RSIM security (Reactive Simulatability) [4]; we refer to
these papers for the rigorous denitions. These denitions
provide very strong security and compositionality guaran-
tees [9, 3]. Compositionality constitutes a particularly im-
portant property in our setting since we want to use CSAR
within a larger context (with the application protocol and
with an accountability technique like PeerReview).
3 Desired security guarantees
We now formally dene an ideal functionality that cor-
responds to the security properties CSAR is supposed to
achieve. The ideal functionality is dened as a collection
of machines ~ MP, one for every entity P. Phrasing the
ideal functionality as a (collection of) machine(s) allows
us to meaningfully compare it to real protocols within ex-
isting simulatable security models, which are all machine-
based.
The behavior of the ideal functionality reects the se-
curity properties informally outlined in Section 1.1. The
ideal functionality does not generate randomness accord-
ing to the protocol description; rather, it chooses truly ran-
dom values ri. The ideal functionality moreover ensures
that even malicious entities cannot lie about their random-
ness. However, malicious entities are allowed to predict
their own future random values even if these values have
not yet been used by the protocol; moreover, previously
used random values of honest entities are revealed to the
adversary. We give these powers to the malicious entities
in the ideal model to explicitly model the security require-
ments that are not fullled by our construction. Hence,
the ideal functionality captures the requirement that, intu-
itively, the randomness generated by CSAR is as good as
true randomness, up to the two imperfections mentioned
above. These imperfections can be eliminated if desired,
but the cost is a computationally more expensive solution,
cf. Section 9.
To model the generation of a single random value in
the real protocol, we let the functionality output a triple
(ri;si;bi) to the environment. Here ri corresponds to
the randomness, si to the audit information, and bi is a
bit which describes whether the audit information is valid.
That is, we assume that in the real protocol, any auditor
which sees si will immediately compute the correspond-
ing bit bi and consider this derived bit to be part of the
audit information. In the real protocol (assuming that it is
secure) the adversary will only have two choices: Either
it chooses ri honestly at random and chooses some audit-
ing information si such that bi = 1, or it chooses ri to
its liking, but then it may only produce auditing informa-
tion si such that bi = 0. In other words, while the real
protocol cannot be designed to output correct valuesri for
maliciousentities that deviatearbitrarilyfromthe protocol,
we can ensure that incorrect values will fail the respective
tests. Intheidealfunctionality,this observationis reected
in the assumption that the adversary can choose the out-
come bi of the test. If the adversary chooses bi = 0, it
may choose the random value; if the adversary chooses
bi = 1, true randomness is always returned. Furthermore,
if the entity is honest, only bi = 1 is allowed (as honest
agents will never produce invalid audit information). Our
security denition in particular does not require any prop-
erties about the si (only about the result of the verication
of the randomness, which is captured by the value of bi).
Consequently, si can be chosen by the adversary even in
the case of honest parties (this is a popular way to model
nondeterminism in cryptographic protocols).
Deﬁnition 2 (Ideal Functionality) The ideal hhonesti
[dishonest] machine ~ MP for entity P performs the
following steps, given security parameters l1 and t2:
 Before the ﬁrst activation, ~ MP initializes an inﬁnite
list of values r1;r2;::: uniformly and independently
4distributed over f0;1gl1.2 [All values ri are made
accessible to the adversary, i.e., a query i from the
adversary is answered with ri.]
 Upon each activation, the inputs to the machine ~ MP
are forwarded to the adversary.
 In ~ MP’s ﬁrst environment activation, ~ MP asks the
adversary for some values (n;q1;:::;qt2). This tu-
ple (n;q1;:::;qt2) is returned to the environment.
The values n;q1;:::;qt2 correspond to values that
might be used in the setup phase, in order to estab-
lish a common random element.3
 In ~ MP’s second environment activation, a random
s 2 f0;1gl1 is chosen and returned. The value s
is also given to the adversary. (s corresponds to the
publicly known seed.)
 In each subsequent environment activation (indexed
consecutively, starting with i = 1), ~ MP sends ri
to the adversary and asks the adversary for a tuple
(~ ri;si;bi). hThen ~ MP returns (ri;si;1).i [Then MP
returns (ri;si;1) if bi = 1 and (~ ri;si;0) otherwise.]
We check that each of the intuitive security require-
ments described in Section 1.1 is implied by this ideal
functionality: Property 1 holds because the ideal function-
ality chooses the random values ri in a truly random way,
even for the malicious parties. Property 2 is satised be-
cause the ideal function will ensure that bi = 0 unless
the adversary uses the honestly generated randomness ri.
Property 3 is ensured because the functionality will reveal
the random values ri corresponding to honest parties only
when an honest party actually requests them. Until then,
they are not accessed by any machine. Property 4 is ful-
lled because in the ideal model we have modeled that the
seed s is chosen in a truly random fashion by the func-
tionality. This implies that any protocol implementing the
functionality also has to choose the seed s in a random
fashion, even if malicious parties are involved.
Moreover, the functionality also explicitly models the
security imperfections of CSAR: The values ri of ma-
licious agents are revealed to the adversary in advance.
Whenever an honest agent uses a random value, that value
ri is revealedto the adversary(becausein the real protocol,
it appears in the audit log). Malicious parties can actually
use non-randomvalues ~ ri; this is only detected by compar-
ing these values to the audit log. The fact that the ideal
functionality has to explicitly model all restrictions of the
protocol is considered one of the main advantages of sim-
ulatable security notions.
2Strictly speaking, the whole innite list is not initialized at the begin-
ning of the protocol, but is lazily built up whenever a value ri is required.
3This step is needed for technical reasons because otherwise the out-
puts of the protocol described in the next section would look syntactically
different from the outputs of the ideal functionality, which is forbidden
by simulatable security denitions.
4 The CSAR protocol
We rst explainthe concepts we exploit in orderto achieve
the desired security guarantees. Afterwards, we give the
formal description of our protocol for generating account-
able randomness.
4.1 Informal overview
4.1.1 Accountability and unpredictability
We rst illustrate how we achieve the accountability and
the unpredictability of the pseudo-random generator, i.e.,
properties 2 and 3 from Section 1.1. Suppose P is an en-
tity that needs to generate random values. We assume that
there is a trapdoor one-way permutation f whose secret
key is known only to P (that is, only P can invert the per-
mutation). For now, we will also assume that there is a
well-known random seed s0; in Section 4.1.3, we describe
how this value is generated with an initial coin-toss.
Since P is the only entity that can invert the permuta-
tionf, it aloneis able tocomputeelementsofthe sequence
si := f 1(si 1). The other entities do not have the secret
key off andthereforecannotcomputenew elements, even
if they already know the old elements s0;:::;si 1. How-
ever, all entities can evaluate f and can therefore validate
a new element si by checking whether f(si) = si 1 holds
true. Since f is a permutation, this check is equivalent
to si = f 1(si 1). (Our proof additionally ensures that
f constitutes a permutation even for incorrectly generated
keys, hence ensuring accountability for dishonest parties
as well.) Thus, we can achieveaccountabilityforthose val-
ues (by including all si in the audit log), and at the same
time, prevent future values from being predicted.
However, directly using the elements si as the desired
random values ri is not secure, because there is a strong
relationship between si and si 1 (one being the image of
the other under f), which would not be the case if the val-
ues were truly random. To avoid this, we use ri := H(si)
as the desired random value. When H is modeled as a
random oracle, H(ri) and H(ri 1) are decoupled and be-
come independent, random elements.
4.1.2 Strong cryptographic randomness
Providing strong cryptographic randomness in the sense
of property 1 from Section 1.1 is difcult in general. For-
tunately, the construction outlined above for computing
the values ri can already be shown to offer strong crypto-
graphicrandomness,providedthat 1)wemodelH as a ran-
dom oracle, and that 2) we make the following change to
ourconstruction: We rst denea hashfunctionH(x) :=
H(1;x)k:::k(t3;x) for a certain parameter t3. Then the
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Figure 1: The randomness generator for t1 = 3. The dashed lines depict the optimized variant from
Section 6.2.
images of this so-called padded hash function H are long
enough to be used as arguments to f. Then, in every t1th
step for a parameter t1, the value si is not computed as
si = f 1(si 1) but as si = f 1(H(si 1)) (see Fig-
ure 1). In the following, we briey describe how this adap-
tation enables the security proof in Section 5.
Recall that our work relies on the well-established ap-
proach of dening security by means of simulation. To
show that a sequence r1 is random, even given the side
information si and f (and if P is malicious, additionally
the secret key for f), we must show the existence of an
efcient machine called the simulator, which, given a se-
quence of values ri, can simulate a realistically looking
protocol execution that results in exactly these values. In
particular, it has to come up with realistic values forsi and
f. Hence, if some property holds for the values ri in the
real protocol, the same property would also hold for the
truly random values ri in the simulation. For instance, if
one could compute the discrete logarithm of ri in the ex-
ecution of the real protocol, one could also compute the
discrete logarithm of the truly randomri in the simulation,
and since the latter is conjecturedinfeasible, it follows that
the discrete logarithm ofri cannot be computed in the real
protocol either  not even by P itself.
In our case, the simulation becomes possible because
H is modeled as a random oracle. Since the simulator has
to simulate H, it is free to choosethevaluesH(x) in a suit-
able manner,as long as the distributionofH(x) is still uni-
form. For example, it can set H(si) := ri, provided that
it can recognize a value s = si. The construction of the ri
outlined above does not yet seem to entail an efcient way
to recognize such values because arbitrary values s may
occur, i might be arbitrarily large, and one would have to
test for arbitrarily many i whether fi(s) = s0 holds. This
is why we require the change described earlier, namely
that in every t1-th step, the value si is not computed as
si = f 1(si 1) but as si = f 1(H(si 1)). Thus, any
s = si fullls fj(s) = H(x) for some j  t1 and some
x. Since the simulator simulates the function H, it knows
all values H(x) that have been queried from H so far,
and thus it can efciently check whether fj(s) = H(x)
holds for some x that has already been queried and for
some j  t1. For values x that have not been queried, one
can easily show that this equation only holds with negligi-
ble probability.
In summary, these two modications allow us to prove
that CSAR offers strong cryptographic randomness guar-
antees, even for randomness produced by malicious enti-
ties. We note that t1 = 1 is a perfectly ne choice from a
security point of view, but larger values oft1 can make the
implementation more efcient. We describe the details in
Section 6.2.
4.1.3 Choosing a suitable seed
We nally turn to the property of suitably choosing the
seed, in the sense of property 4 from Section 1.1. So far,
ourconstructionpresupposedthat the initial seeds0 is cho-
sen randomly, and that the function f is chosen correctly,
even if P is malicious. A suitable choice of s0 can be en-
forced by choosing s0 with a coin-toss, which can easily
be implemented using the hash function H. Enforcing a
correct choice of f turns out to be more difcult. Since
the secret key of f must not be disclosed to any partici-
pant other than P, P chooses f on its own. This opens
the possibility that f could be badly-formed in one of the
following two ways.
First, f might not constitute a permutation. In this case,
the values si will not necessarily be uniformly distributed;
worse, some value si 1 may have several preimagessi un-
der f, so that P may be able to choose the next random
value from these possible values. This can be preventedby
nding a way to prove that f indeed constitutes a permu-
tation. In particular, this will ensure accountability fordis-
honest users that might incorrectlygenerate their keys, but,
since the secret key must not be revealed, it is difcult to
prove in general. In the case of the low-exponentRSA per-
mutation, however, it turns out to be sufcient to show for
a few random values yi that all these values have a preim-
age under f. Hence, in order to prove that f constitutes a
6permutation, CSAR computes values q = f 1(H(;n)),
where n is the RSA modulus used by f. We elaborate on
this in detail in the long version of this paper [2].
The second possibility is that an incorrectly chosen f
might have a small period, i.e., for some s0 and some ,
wemighthavethats+ = f(s) = s andconsequently
that r+ = r. This is circumvented by including P and
i in all hash values. Hence, even in the case s+ = s,
we still have r+ 6= r.
4.2 Formal description of CSAR
We now formally describe the protocol for generating ac-
countablerandomness. CSAR is designedas asubprotocol
for inclusion in some larger application like PeerReview;
here, we only specify the routines for generating random-
ness and for generating and verifying the corresponding
proofs. Full-scale accountability is then provided at the
next layer, e.g., by PeerReview.
4.2.1 Parameters and additional notation
CSAR isparametrizedbythefollowingvalues: thevaluel1
is the length of H(x) for any x. The value l2 is the length
of the RSA modulus used. The values t1;t2;t3;t4  1 de-
note integers satisfying t3l1  l2. The security of CSAR
will be guaranteed if t1, t2, t3l1   l2, and t4 are of at least
linear size in the security parameter; see also Theorem 1
below. For the setup phase, we additionally need a func-
tion ! that maps each entity P to a set of other entities
!(P) such that at least one entity in each set fPg [ !(P)
is guaranteed to be honest during the setup phase. The
witness set function in PeerReview can be used for this
purpose.
We use the following notation: H(x) denotes an appli-
cation of the random oracle. When writing H(x;y;:::)
we assume that the tuple (x;y;:::) is encoded into a sin-
gle string in some efcientlydecodablefashion. By H(x)
we denote H(1;x)k:::kH(t3;x). Note that the length
of H(x) is at least l2. For an integer n (not necessar-
ily an RSA modulus), we write fn to denote the func-
tion fn(x) := x3 mod n. In a slight abuse of notation,
we write f 1
n (x) 2 f0;:::;n   1g for the preimage of
x mod n under fn, provided that fn constitutes a permu-
tation on f0;:::;n   1g. Note though that even if f 1
n is
dened, it is the inverse of fn only on f0;:::;n   1g.
4.2.2 Setup phase
CSAR starts witha setup phaseforgeneratingtheseed and
the permutation f. In this phase, each entity P performs
the following steps with the entities in !(P):
 P chooses a random RSA modulus n such that 3 -
'(n) andcomputesthesecretkeyd with3d  1 mod
'(n). P does not store the secret key in its audit log.
 P computes q := f 1
n (H(pk;;n)) for
 = 1;:::;t2 and sends a signed message
(pk;n;q1;:::;qt2) to each entity in !(P). Here pk
denotes an arbitrary but xed string that is different
from the identier of any entity.
 The entities in P [ f!(P)g perform a coin-toss (see
below), which produces a random value s.
 Finally, P sets s0 := H(P;start;s) where P de-
notes a string encoding the identity of the entity P,
andstartdenotessomearbitrarybutxedstringthat
is not an integer.
Thesetup phase includesa coin-toss subprotocolto pro-
duce a random value s. Entities P;P1;:::;Pk perform
a coin toss as follows. First, they choose random values
r;r1;:::;rk. Then each entity Pi computes ci := H(ri)
and produces a signature i on ci. Next, all (ci;i) are
sent to P. P sets c := H(r), h := (c;c1;1;:::;ck;k),
and produces a signature  on h. Then each Pi checks all
signatures in h, produces a signature 0
i on h, and sends
(ri;0
i) to P. Finally, P checks all signatures 0
i and sends
(r;r1;:::;rk) to P1;:::;Pk. Theoutcomeof the cointoss
is s := r  r1    rk.
The coin-toss subprotocol can easily be shown to pro-
duce a random value s, provided that at least one entity is
honest. All messagesaresigned,sothatwhenpluggingthe
subprotocolinto PeerReview, every entity can provethat it
indeed behaved correctly (since the coin-toss subprotocol
is only invoked once, the communicationand computation
overhead induced in particular by the signatures is accept-
able). We do not require the value s to remain secret; this
strongly facilitates performinga secure coin toss, in partic-
ular in the random oracle model.
4.2.3 Generating random values
To generate a random valueri and the correspondingaudit
information, an entity P performs the following steps. Let
i be a sequential index, starting at i = 1. If t1 j i   1, P
sets si := f 1
n (H(P;i   1;si 1)); if t1 - i   1, P sets
si := f 1
n (si 1). P then chooses ri := H(P;i;si) and
stores si;ri in the audit log.
4.2.4 Verifying random values
To verify a random value ri, an auditor evalu-
ates the following function Verify on the values
(P;n;s;ri;q1;:::;qt2;s1;:::;si), where P is a string en-
codingthe identity of the entity P, s is the value computed
in the coin-toss, ri is the current random value,q1;:::;qt2
are the values sent in the setup phase and s1;:::;sn are
the values found in the audit log.
7Deﬁnition 3 (Veriﬁcation function) When invoked as
Verify(P;n;s;ri;q1;:::;qt2;s1;:::;si) with i  1, the
function Verify performs the following checks:
 s
?
2 f0;:::;n   1g for  = 1;:::;i.
 fn(q)
?
 H(pk;;n) mod n for  = 1;:::;t2.
 fn(s)
? = s 1 for all  = 1;:::;i with t1 -    1.
 fn(s)
?
 H(P;   1;s 1) mod n for all  =
1;:::;i with t1 j  1 where s0 := H(P;start;s).
 ri
? = H(P;i;si mod n).
An implementation does not need to perform all these
checks upon each invocation of Verify. Since only one
new value si occurs for each new randomness query, each
evaluation of Verify essentially uses one application of fn
(costing two multiplications) and some hashing. Further-
more, at most t1 values si need to be stored when such an
incremental evaluation of Verify is used.
5 Security proof
We now formally establish the security guarantees offered
by CSAR by comparing it to the ideal functionality pre-
sented in Section 3.
We rst phrase the protocol in terms of an I/O machine
that can be meaningfully compared to the ideal function-
ality in the simulatable security models. To facilitate the
modeling, we include both the generation of the random-
ness and the verication of the proofs using Verify in a
single machine MP for every entity P. In a real imple-
mentation, these two algorithms would of course run on
different machines; in particular, Verify would be evalu-
ated several times.
Deﬁnition 4 (Real machine) The real hhonesti
[dishonest] machine MP for entity P performs the
following steps:
 In the ﬁrst activation by the environment, hMP gen-
erates the values (n;q1;:::;qt2) honestly according
to the randomness generation protocoli [asks the ad-
versary for some values (n;q1;:::;qt2)]. This tu-
ple (n;q1;:::;qt2) is returned to the environment.
 In MP’s second environment activation, MP chooses
a random s 2 f0;1gl1 and returns s to the environ-
ment. The value s is also given to the adversary.4
 In each subsequent environment activation (the
i-th randomness query, starting with i = 1),
hMP generates the values ri;si according
4Here we simplify: Instead of using the coin-toss subprotocol, we
assume that the initial seed s is chosen as true randomness. A complete
treatment would have to prove that the coin-toss subprotocol presented
above actually returns a truly random s. At this point, however, we treat
the subprotocol as a black-box since it uses only well-known techniques.
to the randomness generation protocoli [MP
asks the adversary for values ri;si]. Then
bi := Verify(P;n;s;ri;q1;:::;qt2;s1;:::;si)
is computed.5 MP returns the triple (ri;si;bi) to the
environment.
The security propertyof CSAR cannow be formallystated
as follows:
Theorem 1 Let l1;l2;t1;t2;t3;# be polynomi-
ally bounded in some security parameter k, and
l2;t2;(t3l1   l2) 2 
(k), and assume that the 3RSA
assumption holds.
Let a set  of entities be given of which an arbitrary
number may be malicious. Then for any polynomial-time
machine A there exists a polynomial-time machine S such
that for any environment Z that does not access the ran-
dom oracle H the following holds: let PR denote the prob-
ability that Z outputs 1 after running together with A and
real machines MP for all P 2 . Let PI denote the prob-
ability that Z outputs 1 after running together with S and
ideal machines ~ MP for all P 2 . Then jPR   PIj is
negligible in the security parameter k.
Constraining the environment Z to not access the random
oracle H translates into the requirement that the protocol
we wish to make accountable using CSAR is not allowed
to use the hash function H. This does not imply, however,
that H has to be secret, since we allow the adversary to
access H. (The formal consequence of disallowing Z's
access to H is that the simulator now can simulate any
values H(x) as long as these values look random. This is
crucial for our simulation proof.)
For reasons of space, we only briey sketch the proof
of Theorem 1. The full proof as well as concrete security
bounds are given in the long version of this paper [2].
Proof sketch. The proof is conducted in three main steps.
First, we dene a variant of the real execution where the
randomoracleH is replacedbya simulation ~ H. Internally,
the simulation ~ H vastly differs from H, but it is designed
to still give (almost) uniformly distributed outputs ~ H(x).
We call the execution using ~ H the hybrid execution, re-
ecting that it is a mix of the real and the ideal execution.
Then we dene several events that represent various possi-
ble failures or imperfections of the simulation ~ H, and we
show that the probability PrBAD of these events is negli-
gible. Next, we show that, unless these events occur, the
outputs of ~ H have the same distribution as those of H. We
thenproceedtoconstructthesimulatorS; thisconstruction
is strongly simplied by the fact that the oracle ~ H already
5Note that the value bi is computed correctly even for malicious P,
since bi is not part of the output of P, but represents whether or not the
output of P would pass the tests.
8computes all values necessary for the execution of S. Fi-
nally, we show that, unless one of the above-mentioned
events occurs, the hybrid and the ideal execution have the
same distribution. Hence, the distribution of the output of
Z in the real and the ideal execution differ only by PrBAD.
6 Implementation
We implemented CSAR as an addition to
libpeerreview, which is an open-source imple-
mentation of PeerReview that was written by the authors
of [16] and is publicly available from [25]. In total, we
added or modied 1984 lines of code.
6.1 Integration with PeerReview
Our implementation is transparent to the user and works
without modications to existing application code; it sim-
ply replaces the library's getRandom function. When
CSAR is enabled, faulty nodes can no longer predict fu-
ture random values of a correct node. In addition, nodes
can be exposed as faulty if they change their random seed
after startup.
Internally, our code extends the application's state ma-
chine to (i) run the randomness generation protocol when
a node is started for the rst time, and to (ii) respond
to coin-toss messages from other nodes. We could have
added these elements as a meta-protocol instead, but our
approachhas the advantagethat the additionalsteps can be
checked natively by PeerReview. Thus, we do not need a
separate mechanism to detect if a node breaks the random-
ness generation protocol or ignores a coin-toss message.
We also extended the log format with additional entries
for the si. Checkpoints now include the tuple (l2;t;i;si),
where i is the index of the last random number generated,
as well as the state of the randomness generation protocol
(while it is active). This is necessarybecause the witnesses
need to be able to start auditing from a recent checkpoint.
Our implementation uses SHA-1 hashes for H, which
implies a hash length of l1 = 160 bits, and it chooses








generation protocol transfers t2 = 5 preimages of length
t4 = 480 bits. The length l2 of the RSA modulus and the
spacing t1 betweenhashes in the si-sequencecan be freely
chosen by the user.
6.2 Higher efﬁciency with precomputation
In a straightforward implementation of CSAR, the most
expensive operation is generating a random number. Ver-
ication is efcient because it only involves applying fn
to each value, and, since fn has been chosen as fn(x) =
x3 mod n, it can be computed with two multiplications
modulon. Ontheotherhand,generatingarandomnumber
requires evaluating f 1
n (x) = xd mod n, which involves
an exponentiation modulo n and is therefore expensive.
However, we can amortize the cost of the exponenti-
ation across several random values. We exploit that for
any m and any j 2 f1;:::;t1g, we have that smt1+j =
f j
n (gm), where gm := H(P;mt1;smt1). In particu-
lar, s(m+1)t1 = f t1
n (gm) and smt1+j = fn(smt1+j+1)
for j = f1;:::;t1   1g. Hence, we can efciently com-
pute an entire block of values smt1+1;:::;s(m+1)t1 by
computing the last value rst, and then deriving the other
values by applying fn t1   1 times (this corresponds to
the dashed lines in Figure 1). Additionally, note that
f t1
n (x)  xd
t1  xc mod n with c := dt1 mod '(n).
Since c needs to be computed only once, the cost for eval-
uating f t1
n is essentially one exponentiation modulo n.
In summary, our implementation computes the se-
quence si in blocks of t1 values. If t1 is sufciently large,
theamortizedcost perrandomvalueis essentiallytwo mul-
tiplications modulo n. This is conrmed by our bench-
marks in Section 8.1.
7 Applications
Randomness is an important instrument in the design
of many distributed algorithms. Ensuring accountable
pseudo-randomness is important in systems where (i) it is
importanttobeabletodetectwhenanodedeviatesfroman
expected sequence of pseudo-random values; and, (ii) pre-
dicting future values in a node's pseudo-random sequence
may allow an attacker to gain an advantage.
In this section, we give a few examples of existing and
prospective applications that use randomness in this way.
In each case, CSAR can be used to add accountability to
these applications without exposing them to attacks.
7.1 Sampling
Some applications use statistical sampling to estimate the
properties of a large system. For example, Massoulié et
al. propose a technique to aggregate statistics of peers in
a peer-to-peer system using random walks or random sam-
ples [21]. A node that performs these samples must follow
a pseudo-random sequence, else it could bias the results.
However, if an attacker can predict future pseudo-random
values generated by benign nodes, it can bias the random
walk towards nodes under its own control or adjust its re-
sponse to the sampling query and thereby inuence the
sampled value.
Random sampling is also used to measure resource us-
age. For example, many routers implement NetFlow [13],













































































(b) Average amount of state that must be revealed to the au-
ditor per random number
Figure 2: Microbenchmarks. With t1 = 100 and an RSA modulus of l2 = 1024 bits, a node can generate a
random number in 19s, and an auditor can verify its choice in 6:1s, given 10:2 bits of information.
billing purposes. In this case, customers wish to verify
that the sampling is truly random; however, if customers
were able to predict the sampling pattern, they could delay
their own trafc when the ISP is about to take a sample,
and thus make their resource usage appear lower.
7.2 Randomized replication
LOCKSS [20] isa distributedstoragesystemforlong-term
data preservation. In LOCKSS, documents are replicated
across a large number of independentstorage nodes. To re-
pair damage from data corruption, the storage nodes peri-
odicallycomparetheir own versionof each documentwith
a number of other nodes. If there is another version that is
much more common, they replace their local version with
it. Many steps of this protocol are heavily randomized, so
as to make it difcult for an attacker to predict the actions
of a correct node.
LOCKSS would benet from accountability because it
could detect and remove faulty nodes early. However, ex-
isting techniques cannot be used because the logs would
have to contain the random seeds, and thus correct nodes
would be predictable. This would undermine the security
of the entire system. This is not the case with CSAR, since




across a set of servers. For example, the TotalRecall stor-
age system places replicas of objects on a random set of
nodes[8]. Ifa nodewas ableto predictthis choice,it could
insert a small dummyobject whenever it knows that it will
be chosen next. Thus, it could reduce its own storage load
at the expense of other nodes.
A similar challenge occurs in anycast services such
as [11], where requests are forwarded along a tree. If a
leaf node can predict from the seed values of the interior
nodes that the next request will be forwarded to it, it can
insert a particularly cheap request and thus cause the more
expensiverequests to beforwardedto other nodes,in order
to shed load unfairly.
8 Evaluation
8.1 Microbenchmarks
We beginbydiscussingthe cost ofthetwo fundamentalop-
erations in CSAR, namely(i) generatinga randomnumber
on a node, and (ii) verifying a random number that was
generated on another node. To quantify the average cost
per operation, we executed each operation 10;000 times
in a tight loop, using a RSA modulus of l2 = 1024 bits
and varying the batching parameter t1. The hardware we
used was a Sun V20Z rack server, which has a 2.5 GHz
AMD Opteron CPU. Figure 2(a) shows our results.
Without precomputation, it takes 1200s to generate a
random number, and 12:7s to verify one. The numbers
vary little with t1, which is expected because the cost of
exponentiation dominates the cost of hashing. However,
if we compute random numbers in blocks of t1 values, as
described in Section 6.2, the average cost drops quickly
with t1. With t1 = 500, a random number can be gener-
ated in only 9:1s and veried in only 6:0s. This shows
that our optimization is effective, and it demonstrates that
the overhead from random number generation should be



































Length of RSA modulus [bits]
Generate (with precomputation)
Verify random number
Figure 3: Key length. The cost per operation in-
creases with the length of the RSA modulus.
In Figure 2(b), we show the average amount of state
that a node must disclose to an auditor for each random
value it generates. If random numbers are generated reg-
ularly, the node only needs to disclose one si, i.e. l2 bits,
for each block of t1 random numbers; hence, the overhead
drops quickly with t1. With t1 = 500, only 2 bits need to
be disclosed on average, although one additional si must
be disclosed duringeach audit if t1 - i. This overheadis in-
signicant, given that the logs of accountable applications
can grow by several megabytes per hour [16].
Figure 3 shows how the average cost per operation in-
creases with the length of the RSA modulus. For this ex-
periment, we chose t1 = 100 and used the same hardware
as above.
8.2 Application-level benchmark
To estimate the overall impact of these costs, we imple-
mented a simple demo application, which consists of a
web server and k clients. The web server allows its clients
to store, retrieve, or delete objects in its store, and it
charges them using a simple random sampling technique:
at random intervals, it picks a random le from its store,
and it charges the owner one credit point. It is clearly
desirable to make such a server accountable to its clients,
since otherwise it might charge arbitrary amounts; how-
ever,withoutCSAR, this is difcultto accomplishbecause
clients would gain the ability to predict when one of their
les will be sampled, and could avoid the charge by tem-
porarily removing that le.
We performeda simulation experimentin which we ran
this server with k = 5 clients for one hour. On average,
the server stored 1000 les with an average size of 10kB,
one of which was requested every second. The expected
number of samples per second was ve, i.e. random num-
bers were used at the rather high rate of ten per second.
The parameters we chose were l2 = 1024 and t1 = 100.
We ran the simulation twice, once using CSAR to generate
the random numbers and once using the lrand function
from GLIBC (which reveals the random seed to the audi-
tor). The workload in the two simulations was identical.
We found that CSAR changed the server's on-disk log
size from 56:5 MB to 56:7 MB, a 0:3% increase. The
amount of information transmitted to the auditors (the ve
clients) changed from 12:5 MB to 13:1 MB, a 4:2% in-
crease. The difference occurs because the on-disk log con-
tains additional information (such as checkpoints) which
is not normally sent to the auditors. These overheads are
small both in relative and absolute terms, which suggests
that CSAR is practical.
9 Variants of our approach
In designing CSAR, we have made some non-obvious de-
sign choices. To highlight the importance of these choices,
we now describe some possible variations of CSAR, and
we point out the challenges that would have to be over-
come to make them work.
9.1 Different choiceofthe trapdoorpermutation
The most obvious variation is to use a different trapdoor
one-way permutation. Although this is possible, there are
a few caveats. First, our optimization technique from Sec-
tion 6.2 is specic to 3RSA. Implementations using alter-
native permutations hence are likely to be much less ef-
cient. Furthermore, if one replaces 3RSA by another
function f, the security of CSAR will only be guaranteed
if f, in addition to being one-way, satises the follow-
ing three properties (which are derived from the security
proof). First, one must be able to efciently prove that f
is indeed a permutation (this is done in CSAR by send-
ing the values q). Second, one must be able to efciently
convert a random bitstring h into an element of the do-
main of f (we did this by computing v mod n). Also, it
must be efciently possible to recognize if a given value
is indeed in the domain of f (we did this by checking
whether si 2 f0;:::;n   1g). The importance of the
last point is best illustrated by an example. Consider the
function fn := x2 mod n. If n is a so-called Blum in-
teger, then fn is a permutation on the quadratic residues
modulo n (see, e.g., [15, App. A.2.4]). However, for any
given quadratic residue si there always exist si+1 6= s0
i+1
with fn(si+1) = fn(s0
i+1) = si where s0
i+1 is not a
quadratic residue. This does not contradict the property
that fn is a permutation on the quadratic residues, but it
still breaks the security of CSAR: in each step a malicious
nodecanchoosebetweentwovalues,andsincenoefcient
way is knownto tell quadraticresiduesfromquadraticnon-
residues, the auditors could not detect an incorrect choice.
119.2 Applying a PRG to ri
In highly randomness-consuming protocols, one might be
tempted to perform the following optimization: one gener-
ates a new ri only when the previous ri has been revealed





2 ;::: of the protocol is generated with a
classical pseudo-random generator from ri. In this case,
however,a malicious node can mount the followingattack:
before performing some action that requires randomness,
the node rst checks what the next value x
(i)
j would be. If
the node does not like this value, the node delays that ac-
tion until the next audit. After that audit, a new seed ri+1
is used and the next value is x
(i+1)
1 , which possibly suits
the node better. Although the effect of this attack may be
small when audits are not too frequent, the possibility of
such an attack is still present. Such an attack may have
important consequences in protocols in which a single ran-
dom value is critical, e.g., if the value determines whether
a given sum of money will be transferred or not.
9.3 Using interaction
OneofthelimitationsofCSAR is thatmaliciousnodescan
predict their own randomness. If the randomness is gener-
ated non-interactively, this is necessarily the case, since a
node can always compute that randomness ahead of time.
One way to circumvent this problem would be to use in-
teractivity: for each random value, P performs a coin-toss
with the entities in !(P) (in this case one could also get
rid of the random oracle). Although a coin-toss is a rather
efcientprotocol,it obviouslyincurs largecommunication
costs (but this might still be feasible for protocolsthat only
rarely need randomness). Another solution is to include
the incoming messages in the generation of the random-
ness, i.e., ri := H(P;i;si;m) where m is the history of
communication. Then even a malicious node can only pre-
dict its own randomness as far as it can predict incoming
communication. However, this approach is awed: if two
malicious nodes collude, they can mutually inuence their
randomness by adaptively choosing the messages they ex-
change.
9.4 Using zero-knowledge
The second limitation of CSAR (which is already present
in the original PeerReview) is that the auditors learn the
state of a node. One can solve this problem by letting a
node send only a hash of its log and then prove that the
hash contains a valid log using a zero-knowledge proof.
Although this is possible in theory, general purpose zero-
knowledgeproofsare extremelyinefcient. Even the most
efcient zero-knowledge proofs either target very specic
number theoretic problems or need to perform a proof
step for each elementary computation step in the proto-
col. Hencetheincurredcomputationalandcommunication
costs would be prohibitive for all but very specic applica-
tions.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we have described CSAR, a technique that
lends accountability to systems that use randomized pro-
tocols. The key contribution is a new technique for gen-
erating cryptographicallystrong, accountable randomness,
that is, a pseudo-randomsequence that comes with a proof
that the elements of the sequence have been correctly gen-
erated, while ensuring that the auditors are unable to learn
anything that would make the node's future actions pre-
dictable. We have applied CSAR to a simple web server
that uses random sampling for billing purposes. Our ex-
periments indicate that the computational cost of CSAR
is low and that the approach is practical: on current hard-
ware and with a 1024-bit RSA modulus, a random number
can be generatedin less than 20s and veried in less than
10s. We have additionally shown that the CSAR's stor-
age and bandwidth costs are low both in relative and in
absolute terms.
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